If a Soviet Rip van Winkel had been in Yekaterinburg on 2 December, he might have thought that the old system was still alive and well. The annual United Russia (UR) party congress had all the trappings of similar Communist Party events in Soviet times.
The development of UR is worth considering. At stake here is the nature and stability of Russia's political system. The Putin administration wants UR to go on providing working parliamentary majorities, but has introduced some controlled competition to check UR's retro tendencies which might otherwise usurp the powers of the presidency itself. This ambivalent construction may just hold over the forthcoming electoral cycle (2007-8), but looks unsustainable in the longer run.
United Russia (UR) is Russia's dominant political party. It embodies the pro-Kremlin bureaucratic and business establishment, and appeals to voters who wish for stability and dislike radicalism of all kinds. This appeal is reinforced by the constant support of television and the many advantages of incumbency, especially at the regional and municipal level.
In the present State Duma elected in December 2003, UR has two-thirds of the seats - a 'constitutional' majority allowing the party (that is, the Kremlin) to pass whatever legislation it pleases. UR owed its election success to the endorsement of the ever more popular president. But Putin himself has not become a party member, on the stated grounds (well supported by opinion poll data) that the Russian people sees the presidency as an office which should remain above the party political fray.
UR is often referred to as the 'party of power'. The label captures the reality that this is not a political party in the accepted sense. For example, the party could not continue to exist in opposition. This has prompted comparisons with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).
Like all comparisons, this can be overdone. UR does not have the CPSU's constitutional monopoly of power. And in contrast to the CPSU's ideologically-based grip on both state and society, UR has had a more modest (and passive) role of championing the varied political and policy initiatives which emanate from today's Kremlin. The latest example is the appearance of 'Sovereign Democracy', a slogan formulated by the Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov, on the title page of the new policy platform adopted at the UR's annual congress on 2 December.
At the same time, this congress highlighted the ever deepening resemblance of UR to the CPSU. Delegates were greeted by members of the "Young Guard" (aka "Komsomol" in Soviet times) waving flags and cheering on their seniors. This retro style is the most visible sign of a revival of old habits and instincts. The reappearance of a ruling party has brought with it the reassurance of familiarity. Officials and businessmen have flocked to join the party for many of the same reasons as in Soviet times: careerism, conformism, access to networks of influence which can help achieve practical results. The congress hall in Yekaterinburg was duly filled with 2,500 delegates (and guests) representing a huge total of 1,220,000 party members.
So the momentum of UR's convergence with the old CPSU model derives from the country's political culture. The party's new policy document is a ten-year programme (as if to outdo the old Soviet five-year plans), and UR leaders have revealed their ambition to set strategic policy directions and to control the government. There are also indications of the party being positioned to hedge the power of the presidency itself.
But further such development along CPSU lines (the 'Party State') looks set to run into obstacles. The first of these is the Kremlin-approved competition with the new Justice Party (see Birth of a two-party system). More fundamentally, UR's ambitions would usurp the powers of the president enshrined in the country's constitution.
The most interesting issue to emerge from the preparations and outcome of the United Russia (UR) congress on 2 December was how much further the party will evolve towards the Soviet-era model of a ruling party which takes over the state itself.
The new UR Strategy document adopted at the congress declares that the President's annual 'state of the nation' address is inadequate on its own to direct the government bureaucracy. Alongside the president, the legislature should set strategic policy goals and monitor their implementation - thereby removing these functions from the grip of the government bureaucracy. A third of public spending should be directed through the National Projects and similar programmes, making the budget a more 'political' document. Separately, UR-sponsored draft legislation is passing through the Duma regulating the 'state of the nation' address and involving the parliament in the follow-up.
RBK, a business news and information service, commented that the proposed co-option at the UR congress of two close Putin associates into the top party leadership should be understood in the context of the forthcoming succession to Putin. The fact that there can be only one winner in this game of musical chairs creates nervousness in various powerful Kremlin factions about the safety of their interests under the successor president. UR will be used to insure against this risk, restricting the discretion of the new president through its control of the legislature - and, possibly by extension, the government...
... Alexander Shokhin, President of the Industrialists' and Entrepreneurs' Union (big business association) and a senior government minister during the 1990s, was quoted by the Interfax news agency as saying that in the next political cycle [after the 2007-8 elections] the government will be 'party political', headed [i.e. the Prime Minister] by one of the leaders of the UR party list in the 2007 Duma election race.
UR leadership attacks on its new Kremlin-approved rival, the Justice Party (JP), betray nervousness about competition. In his keynote speech at the congress, UR leader Boris Gryzlov accused JP of "irresponsible populism". In a move widely regarded as designed to deprive JP leader Sergey Mironov of his power base as speaker of the Federation Council (upper house of the federal parliament), UR co-founder Sergey Shoigu launched an initiative to revert to electing upper house members by a popular vote, with the first such election to be held in March 2007.
Andrey Kolesnikov, political columnist for RIA Novosti, commented in Vedomosti that UR is not viable in its present form. To survive, it must evolve further towards the CPSU 'ideal' of a party state, and is genetically programmed to strive towards this goal. But it faces insurmountable obstacles along this path. The existence of competition from the Justice Party will deprive it of the monoply appeal of the party which you must join if you want to take any part in political life. In a competitive environment, UR will lose its present 'party of power' status - just as its 1990s equivalent ('Russia - Our Home') did before it.
Vedomosti, the leading business daily, commented that the UR plan to marginalise the government and control economic policy on a par with the president would mean amending the constitution in a fundamental way. Such amendments would in turn require the convening of a Constituent Assembly, the framework legisation for which does not yet exist.
Andrey Kolesnikov makes a strong point. United Russia (UR) was brought into existence to provide the Kremlin with a working majority in the federal and regional parliaments, and this has now been achieved. Left to its own devices, UR would tend to evolve from here towards the Soviet 'party-state' model. That would result logically in the modern-day equivalent of the collective leadership proclaimed at various junctures in Soviet history (such as the early Brezhnev period) whereby the president (as today's equivalent of the General Secretary of the ruling Communist Party) becomes a mere first among equals (the 'peers' being the ruling party leadership).
But all the evidence is that UR will not be left to its own devices. Russia today has a presidential system of government. Neither Putin nor his succesors for the forseeable future can be expected to surrender their constitutional powers to a monopoly political party. In his major annual press conference in January 2006, Putin said that given the primitive state of Russia's political parties, it would be premature and "irresponsible" to move to a party political government.
The Kremlin's decision to create an approved competitor to UR in the form of the new Justice Party looks to have been at least partly motivated by a desire to check UR's tendency to turn into a CPSU for the twenty-first century. If the dominant political party is forced to compete with a serious rival, it becomes easier for the president to control the big picture.
At the same time, the Kremlin is clearly counting on UR remaining the reliable majority party in the next Duma due to be elected in 2007. That means, no change to the present construction.
Looking ahead to the next four-year political cycle, 'no change' is not an option. Either the newly introduced limited political competition will take on a life of its own, or the Kremlin will have second thoughts about the cost-benefit ratio of that competition. In the first scenario, the government and ultimately the presidency itself will be drawn into the party political system, leading to a more mature democracy. Or, if that radical departure from the present authoritarian plebiscital presidency is unpalatable to the ruling group, the competition will be stamped out, restoring the prospect of a latterday Soviet-style 'Party-State' after all.
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