The annual “state of the nation” address, which President Dmitry Medvedev delivered earlier this week, has sharpened the already rising pitch of chatter about the future of his political partnership with Vladimir Putin. This question must be resolved one way or the other during the next 12 months. Since the issue is back at the centre of attention, now seems a good time to explain why recent developments reinforce my view – very unfashionable when first set out in our January 2010 note The Medvedev-Putin tandem at mid-term – that Medvedev will serve a second term as President from 2012.
What is at stake here may be obvious but is still important enough to be worth re-stating. If Medvedev remains president, his hands will be untied and Russia will have gone through a genuine leadership succession – the third since Boris Yeltsin brought down Mikhail Gorbachev (and the Soviet Union) in 1991 and Putin succeeded Yeltsin in 2000. Russian financial markets would likely give an immediate and strong welcome to the simple fact of a new start and the natural casting aside of the negative associations that inevitably attach to a long preceding incumbency. Should Putin return to the presidency, the leadership rotation will be postponed by at least six years and perhaps even 12 years (constitutional amendments passed in 2008 extended the presidential term from 4 to 6 years). By contrast, the continuation of Putin’s rule in renewed undiluted form after what, in this scenario, would merely have been a caretaker Medvedev presidency would reinforce the negative perceptions that have become increasingly entrenched this year about Russia’s prospects. I should add that those market reactions would make themselves strongly felt regardless of the performance of either Medvedev or Putin.
Since Putin always likes to play his cards close to his chest, the outcome will probably not be clear until the State Duma elections which are due in December 2011 (but which might be brought forward to October). Investors in Russia will meanwhile be subjected to much idle Kremlinology, which will prove nothing and may be safely ignored. Punditry on the “state of the nation” address is a good example.
The standard take on that speech is that by concentrating on social issues (families, education), Medvedev was electioneering. Similarly, Putin’s high public profile last summer (fighting forest fires in person, his road trip in a Lada car in Russia’s Far East) was widely regarded as evidence of his plan to return to the presidency. But these episodes cannot support such conclusions. The most that can be said is that both men are preparing the ground for having their names on the presidential election ballot paper, but that is already reflected in the official public line that options are being kept open until they agree between themselves nearer the time on what to do.
You may be wondering what, in that case, is the basis for our call that Medvedev will remain president. The answer to that question is not Kremlinological readings of passing events but rather the analysis of underlying political logic.
The stabilization achieved under Putin is an absolutely necessary but still insufficient condition for the country’s successful development out of the ruins of communism. The next phase goes under the slogan of “modernization”, which Medvedev appropriated in his September 2009 manifesto “Forward, Russia!” The starting point of Medvedev’s pitch was that the economic slump exposed the enormity of the challenges which are still facing Russia and were obscured by the preceding boom. Medvedev’s agenda is a natural building on the foundation laid by Putin. In my view, this goes even for developments that many might reckon to be anti-Putin, such as support for greater political competition and the reappearance of genuine political discussion on the central television networks. All the evidence is that Putin both willed this agenda and, of course, selected his young protege, Medvedev, to front it.
Here is the key point: fresh policy initiatives need to be personified by a new face for the sake of credibility and dynamism. Thus continues Russia’s development under a stable ruling establishment. It would therefore be destabilizing – especially within the elite – were the new face to be eclipsed by the old face. The path of least resistance is inertia: Medvedev stays in the Kremlin.
Surkov signal
This logic was highlighted and underpinned by a notable statement by Deputy Kremlin Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov at a meeting with some visiting American students in November. For the past decade, Surkov has been Russia’s Karl Rove: a creative political strategist with decisive influence. He served Putin in the Kremlin and is now at Medvedev’s side. It is always worth paying attention to what he says (back in September, for example, it was Surkov who gave the first unmistakeable signal that Luzhkov would be removed from his post as Mayor of Moscow).
Surkov’s message to his American guests was that although United Russia would win next year’s parliamentary election, it would lose its present two-thirds majority in the State Duma. In 10 years’ time, Surkov predicted, the opposition would start to win elections. These remarks were followed by Medvedev’s 23 November video blog warning against encroaching “stagnation” (a highly charged word in Russia, since it evokes the Brezhnev period), and highlighting the potential of various changes to election rules introduced since 2008 to achieve the necessary increase in political competition. The implication is obvious: Putin’s return to the presidency would signify stagnation.
The continuation of Russia’s stable development – which all along has been Putin’s central project – militates against his return to the Kremlin. Of course, it is perfectly reasonable to speculate that a part of Putin remains extremely reluctant to loosen his grip on power. Nothing could be more human – or, at least, more natural for a successful political leader. And a second Medvedev term would certainly entail the relative decline of Putin’s power even in the plausible event that he (Putin) also stuck initially to his present post of prime minister. This is because a re-elected Medvedev could exercise the vast presidential powers without anything to lose: it would be his last term, and also a longer one (six years, as mentioned above). Moreover, as Surkov has highlighted, the last-resort lever of impeachment would disappear as United Russia under Putin’s leadership would no longer command the necessary two-thirds majority in the Duma.
I conclude that the real political risk in Russia’s forthcoming election season is not the outcome – that is, a second Medvedev term – but rather the way that Putin’s preference for keeping options open will prolong uncertainty and encourage destabilizing intrigues and even shocks. As in the agonisingly long run-up to Putin’s decision on the presidential succession in 2007, we may see corruption allegations and indictments flying between rival bureaucratic factions at senior levels.
The worst scenario of all would be the use of terrorist threats or outrages to create a sense of national emergency as justification for Putin to become president again. Any such horror would recall the backdrop to Putin’s original rise in late 1999. But this scenario is highly unlikely, in my view, as Russia’s ruling establishment is now vastly more stable and powerful. On the other hand, the best possible scenario – where Putin signals early agreement to a second Medvedev term – is also unlikely.
With best regards,
Christopher Granville
Director, Russia & FSU Research
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