Like any chronic disease, corruption can maim without killing. In the post-Soviet world, this sickness is deeply ingrained in society. While not ruling out decent investment returns, it always corrodes them. Constantly present beneath the surface, like a fire in the hold of a ship, corruption should be kept firmly in mind when assessing all risks in Russia.
This year, President Putin has launched a new anti-corruption drive. Reactions are predictable: officials herald a new dawn, while experts remain understandably sceptical. There are signs this time of stronger political will to reduce tolerance for corruption. Injecting some fear back into the system is a necessary, albeit insufficient, condition for progress.
Update (20 November): The continuing anti-corruption drive brought the arrest of seven high level officials of the Federal Mandatory Medical Insurance Fund. They are charged with taking bribes from pharmaceutical companies.
The scale and depth of corruption in Russia make it the most serious underlying country risk factor. Corruption impairs investment returns not only in countless specific businesses, but also in general. For the overall economic growth required for strong company earnings depends primarily now on investment; and the investment climate is constantly spoiled by corruption.
The worst spoiler is predatory officialdom extorting from business. Like many parasites, this 'state mafia' for the most part stops sensibly short of killing its host - that is, private business, which copes as best it can. But this remains a key disincentive to entrepreneurship and investment.
This central 'state mafia' risk needs to be set in the perspective of other forms of corruption.
|
Type |
Comment |
|---|---|
|
'State mafia' |
Officials extorting from business and/or using their powers and position to run their own business - undermining private sector competitors |
|
Everyday |
Public services provided only on payment of 'additional contributions' |
|
Private |
Managers stealing from shareholders, employees from their companies - and from each other |
This typology of corruption underlines how the problem runs deep in society. This fact is an even more serious obstacle to effective remedies than the scale of the problem (the latest estimate, from the General Prosecutor's Office, putting total annual bribe-taking at $240 billion, or a colossal 25% of 2006F GDP).
In a vicious circle of social degradation, corruption alienates citizens while setting a compelling example. The Levada Centre polling organisation shows a large section of the public (35-40%) actively mistrusting the police - the most egregious state mafia of all. But an equally typical attitude is: if you can't beat 'em, join 'em.
In the face of such nihilism, successive Russian governments have done little more than pay lip-service to the fight against corruption. Periodic corruption cases are regarded by the public as a pretext for one set of bosses to settle scores with another rather than a genuine attempt to tackle the problem.
But in his annual 'state of the nation' address in May 2006, President Putin launched a new anti-corruption drive. This triggered a series of arrests and dismissals of more senior officials than seen in previous such episodes (for details, see 2006 Anti-corruption drive highlights). In July, the newly appointed Chief Prosecutor, Yury Chaika, took up the baton, with over 600 criminal cases since being opened against state officials for alleged bribery offences.
Hand-wringing over corruption is not new in Russia. Corruption touches every aspect of life in Russia. So are there any reasons for supposing that the latest anti-corruption drive will be an improvement on previous ineffective attempts?
Putin's public acknowledgement of the persistence of this problem as one of the failures of his presidency combined with the subsequent high-level sackings shows that this latest anti-corruption campaign is earnest, and no-one will be above the law.
The roots of corruption in Russia are so deep that it will take generations before a significant change is seen in attitudes. And it is not just in Russia itself that corruption raises its ugly head. Russian businessmen abroad are swift to offer bribes to get things done.
Given the depth of the corruption problem and the inevitably slow pace of any change for the better, the sceptics in this debate will always appear to have the stronger case.
The INDEM study makes the sceptical case most rigorously. Rather than simply questioning the authorities’ motives on the anti-corruption front, the study highlights in quantitative terms how far there is to go in terms of implementing a genuine zero tolerance policy.
At the same time, the results to date of this year’s new anti-corruption campaign do suggest stronger political will to tackle the problem than in the past. This is reflected in the seniority of the officials sacked and/or prosecuted, and in the fact that even the FSB no longer seems immune (for details, see 2006 Anti-corruption drive highlights).
Also new is the focus of the quite impressive new Chief Prosecutor, Yuri Chaika, on scale. This is what Chaika’s deputy, Alexander Buksman, must mean by “a principally new approach”. Scale is what is needed, since a large quantity of successful prosecutions across the board is the only way to build credibility for the campaign as determined and impartial with no hidden agenda.
The arrests at the Federal Mandatory Medical Insurance Fund, announced on 17 November, may be a significant step in this direction. The Director of the Fund, Andrei Taranov, his two deputies, three department heads and one other official have been charged with taking bribes and abusing their official positions. More specifically, they are under suspicion of taking backhanders from representatives of pharmaceutical companies to promote their products over those of their rivals. Are more to follow?
Instilling a culture of zero tolerance has to start with increasing the fear factor. A paradoxical reason for the widespread perception that corruption has been getting even worse in recent years is stability. As things settle down, officials become more adept at ‘working the system’ – and doing so with impunity, as the Soviet-era fear of repression recedes. In today’s Russia, fear of the consequences will be the only effective restraint on the state mafia and its clients – rather than the appeal of the well-meaning Public Chamber to moral and religious scruples.
As well as the ‘stick’ of widescale repression, there must also be the ‘carrot’ of deregulation and civil service restructuring. The World Bank study usefully highlights the continuing regulatory improvements of recent years. The new Customs Code – which applies to one of the very worst corruption blackspots – deserves particular mention in this context.
The best test is the quantitative one suggested in the INDEM research. How many prosecutions of officials for bribery and other forms of corruption are (a) initiated and (b) result in convictions with prison terms. The base numbers against which to compare are (for the 12 months to July 2006) 3,600 prosecutions, of which 507 ending in prison terms.